Articles Posted in Personal Injury Legal Theories

When you are injured by the actions of someone who works for the government, you may have a claim for compensation following your injury. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) allows for private citizens to bring lawsuits against the United States for damage or loss of property, injury, or death if the harm was inflicted by a government employee’s negligence. A California personal injury attorney can assist with bringing these complex claims.

There is, however, an exception to the FTCA—the discretionary function exception (DFE). A private citizen is unable to sue the government in a tort claim if the government employee was performing a discretionary function or duty when they injured the plaintiff. In other words, if the government employee had leeway to make decisions or to act independently while performing the action that injured the plaintiff, you may be unable to sue the government under the FTCA for damages.

In a recent 9th Circuit Court of Appeals case, the court had to consider an issue involving the FTCA. The plaintiff was asleep in a park recreation area in his tent when a tree crashed into the tent and smashed his foot. The plaintiff sued under the FTCA and argued that the government negligently failed to cut down the tree. The district court dismissed under the DFE of the FTCA, and the plaintiff appealed.

California’s beautiful weather year-round means people are always taking advantage of all of nature and recreational activities available outdoors. Whether you prefer to hike, bike, or just enjoy a local walking trail, there’s something for everyone. These outdoor recreational spaces, however, can sometimes pose unknown or unexpected dangers. However, when accidents occur at a local park or recreational area, accident victims may face legal hurdles when pursuing a personal injury lawsuit.

In a recent California Court of Appeal decision, the court considered a claim relating to trail immunity. According to the court’s opinion, the plaintiff frequently rode bis bicycle through a local park, where a fence created a physical barrier that cyclists had to maneuver around when moving along the trail. At some point unknown to the plaintiff, the old fence was replaced with a wire cable type fence.

On the day of the accident, the plaintiff was riding his bicycle along the trail, did not see the wire cables strung between the new fence posts, and mistakenly believed he could ride through them. When he attempted to do so, he was thrown from his bicycle over the handlebars and onto the ground, suffering serious injuries. The plaintiff sued the local county in charge of maintaining the park. The county responded by asserting that the plaintiff’s claims were under the county’s trail immunity. The lower court sided with the defendants, holding that because the new fencing was a “condition” of the trail, the defendants were immune from legal action.

Recently, a state appellate court issued an opinion in a lawsuit stemming from a fatal California car accident. The record indicates that the victim was driving around 70 miles per hour on a highway in the same lane as the defendant. The defendant saw a car stopped in the middle of the highway in front of him and moved over to pass the stopped vehicle. When the defendant was about 300 feet past the car, he saw the victim’s car collide with the stopped vehicle. The collision caused the victim’s car to leave the lane it was in, colliding with another vehicle. The defendant saw the accident in his rear-view mirror, and called 911.

The victim’s representative filed a complaint against several parties, including the driver of the stopped car, the driver of the car that hit the victim, the owner of the stopped vehicle, and the owner of the vehicle that hit the victim. Sometime after the original complaint, the plaintiff added the defendant as a party, reasoning that the defendant’s late lane change prevented the victim from noticing the vehicle stopped in the middle of the road. In response, the defendant cited California’s sudden emergency doctrine. The trial court agreed that the doctrine provided the defendant with a complete defense, and the plaintiff appealed.

California’s “sudden emergency” or “imminent peril” doctrine protects defendants from liability in a negligence lawsuit. It typically applies when a defendant, who was otherwise acting with reasonable care, is suddenly and unexpectedly faced with an emergency that the defendant did not cause. To prevail on this defense, a defendant must establish three main elements. A defendant must prove that the events arose when there was a sudden emergency where someone was in actual or imminent injury, the defendant did not cause the emergency, and the defendant acted with due care, even if an alternative action was safer.

A state appellate court was recently tasked with deciding whether an amusement park could be held liable in a California product liability case after the plaintiff was injured while riding on a waterslide. The issue was whether the defendant amusement park was providing a service rather than a product. Ultimately, the court concluded that the record was insufficient to show the amusement park primarily delivered a service, and therefore, summary judgment for the defendant on the product liability claim was denied. Thus, the plaintiff’s case will be permitted to proceed towards trial or settlement negotiations.

According to the court’s opinion, the plaintiff was injured going down a waterslide at the amusement park. After slipping from a seated position on the inner tube onto his stomach, he fractured his hip and pelvis when his feet hit the bottom of the pool. Among other issues, the plaintiff claimed that the waterslide was a defective product that caused his injuries.

The amusement park claimed that it could not be held liable under a product liability theory because it provided a service, rather than a product. A successful product liability claim can hold a supplier or producer of a defective product liable, and also allows a plaintiff to recover compensation for injuries resulting from the defective product. However, product liability claims do not apply when the defendant is delivering a “service” to the consumer rather than supplying a product. For this particular case, the court needed to determine whether guests pay the admission fee to the amusement park to use the waterslides, in which case products liability applies, or if the admission fee is paid to obtain a service which may include the use of waterslides.

In a recent opinion, a California court refused to hold a ridesharing company liable for an accident caused by one of its drivers. The driver was using a car made available to him through the ridesharing company when he caused a California car accident resulting in injuries to two other motorists. The injured motorists filed a lawsuit against the ridesharing company, as well as the driver, arguing that the ridesharing company should be held liable for the driver’s actions while using a car provided through the driver’s employment. The ridesharing company denied legal responsibility, arguing that the driver was engaged in purely personal activity at the time of the accident.

The main issue, in this case, was whether the driver was acting within the scope of their employment when the accident occurred. An employer may be held liable for injuries wrongfully caused by an employee where the injured party filing the lawsuit proves that the person who caused the injury was acting “within the scope” of their employment. Conversely, an employer is not liable where the employee’s activity was “purely personal.

California uses two tests to determine whether an employee was acting within the scope of their employment at the time of an accident. The first is the Purton test, which considers whether the employee’s activity was undertaken with the employer’s permission, and whether it was of some benefit to the employer or typical within the context of employment. The second test is the Halliburton test, which considers whether the activity was required or incident to the employee’s duties, or whether the employee’s misconduct was reasonably foreseeable by the employer.

Recently, a young woman who was struck and suffered serious injuries in a crosswalk filed an appeal in a lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles (the City). According to the court’s opinion, the high school sophomore was hit by a car in a crosswalk while she was walking to school. The young woman filed a personal injury lawsuit against the City, arguing that the intersection was a dangerous condition. She contended that the City was in the process of installing a traffic signal at the scene of the accident, but it was untimely and incomplete when the accident occurred.

During discovery, the plaintiff obtained information about a previous fatal pedestrian accident at the same intersection. Discovery included documents related to the City’s investigation of the earlier incident, including their application for federal funds through the Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP). In response, the defendant objected, arguing that the intersection did not constitute a dangerous condition and moved to preclude the admission of the HSIP application documents under title 23 of the U.S. Code section 409 (section 409). On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the privilege under section 409 did not apply to the HSIP application, and even if it did, the defendant waived their privilege.

Congress enacted the Hazard Elimination Program to encourage the federal government and states to work in concert to improve road conditions and safety. States that apply for funds through this program must engage in a thorough evaluation of its roads and present the entity with its findings. In response to confidentiality issues, Congress enacted section 409, which precludes admission of these documents into evidence, for any action for damages. In this case, the plaintiff conceded that the documents she presented were a part of the HSIP application, but claimed that the privilege does not apply because it was not a “report, survey, schedule, list or data,” within the meaning of section 409. The court found that the application was exactly the type of document section 409 was designed to protect, and the court’s search for truth in a civil matter does not outweigh Congress’ intent to protect those that are applying for federal funds.

Recently, a California appeals court issued an opinion addressing a plaintiff’s evidentiary burden in a premises liability lawsuit. The appeal stems from a wrongful death lawsuit filed on behalf of a 16-year-old girl who died after a freight train hit her. The teenage girl routinely crossed a railroad to reach her bus stop. On the day of the accident, the railroad crossing was flashing warning lights and bells to indicate an oncoming train. However, the girl continued on the path with her head down, and as she stepped onto the tracks, the freight train struck her. The girl died on impact.

The girl’s family filed a premises liability and negligence lawsuit against the freight train company, alleging that the freight train company owned the crossing, knew it posed a danger, and failed to ensure appropriate safety measures, such as pedestrian barriers. The freight train company moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did not possess a duty to make the premises safe because they did not own, possess, or control the railroad tracks or the land surrounding the area. Further, they claimed that they did not negligently operate the freight train.

In support of their motion for summary judgment, the train company provided evidence of a shared-use agreement between the train company and the entity that owned the land. The agreement stated that the freight train company only possessed the right to use the tracks and warning systems, but did not own or operate the railroad or surrounding property.

Recently, a state appellate court issued an opinion in a case against a California nursing home. The case required the court to determine if an arbitration agreement, signed by the resident’s adult daughter, was valid and enforceable. Ultimately, the court affirmed the lower court’s finding that there was substantial evidence suggesting that the resident’s daughter did not have the authority to sign the form and agree to submit any subsequent claims to arbitration. Thus, the court rejected the facility’s request to force the case into arbitration.

According to the court’s opinion, the plaintiff’s mother was a resident at the defendant nursing home. The plaintiff’s mother had a history of diabetes, dementia, end-stage renal disease, generalized muscle weakness, and other debilitating conditions. At some point during her stay, the plaintiff’s mother required hospitalization. Upon her mother being re-admitted to the facility after being discharged from the hospital, the plaintiff signed a two-page document containing an agreement to arbitrate any claims arising out of the facility’s care of her mother. The plaintiff signed on her mother’s behalf. The plaintiff’s mother did not sign the document.

Later, the plaintiff’s mother passed away from a worsening medical condition. The plaintiff filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the facility, and the facility moved to compel arbitration, based on the agreement signed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that the agreement was invalid because, at the time that she signed it, she did not have the legal ability to sign away her mother’s right to access the court system.

A state appellate court recently considered when an “excuse” jury instruction is appropriate in a California car accident case. According to the court’s opinion, the plaintiff was driving on the highway when a mattress suddenly flew at her vehicle, causing her to swerve and hit the barrier. Eye-witnesses stated that they saw the mattress come from the defendant’s truck, and the plaintiff sued. California law requires that vehicles be loaded so that the materials on them stay put. The plaintiff alleged negligence per se, which is a finding of negligence based on a violation of the law.

The trial court gave a jury instruction stating that a violation of the law is excused if it is found that the defendant was using reasonable care but was still unable to obey the law. The jury found that the defendant was not negligent. However, at trial, the defendant driver stated that there was no mattress in his truck on the day in question. The jury, in reaching its decision, did not state whether it was based on a finding that the defendant’s truck was not the source of the mattress or whether the defendant had an excuse, based on the instruction in question. The plaintiff appealed.

The appellate court agreed with the plaintiff that the excuse instruction was improper and remanded the case back to the trial court. The court explained that the situation at hand did not present the special circumstances necessary to warrant an excuse instruction. There was no evidence that the defendant used reasonable care to ensure there was no mattress in the back of his truck because he relied on his coworker’s word that the truck was empty, even though it would have been relatively easy for him to check himself. Nor was there evidence that the defendant was unable to comply with the law in question, requiring items in trucks to be secured. Because there were no special circumstances, the court held that the excuse instruction was improperly given. Additionally, the court’s opinion explained that the instruction was improperly worded in that it failed to make clear that the burden to establish the excuse is on the defendant, rather than the plaintiff.

California accident victims can pursue a claim for compensation against anyone they believe to be responsible for their injuries. To successfully bring such a claim, a plaintiff must be able to establish that the defendant’s negligence was the cause of their injury. This is referred to as the element of causation.

To establish causation, a plaintiff must prove that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff’s injury was a result of the defendant’s conduct. However, causation cannot be based solely on speculation. The mere possibility that the defendant’s conduct was the cause is insufficient to prove causation; a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s breach of duty was a proximate or legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Generally, the jury must decide if the plaintiff has proved causation. However, if the issue of causation involves a legal determination, the court can decide whether causation is sufficient in a motion for summary judgment.

California injury cases can be complicated and may involve multiple parties. A defendant’s negligent conduct does not need to be the sole cause of the plaintiff’s injury in order for a jury to find them liable for the injury. California law follows the “substantial factor” test in determining cause-in-fact. That means to meet the causation element, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. If a defendant’s conduct took place at the same time as other acts, the defendant’s conduct may be a “substantial factor” if the injury would not have occurred but for the actor’s conduct. If the simultaneous negligence of two parties contributes to the plaintiff’s injury, each person’s acts will be considered the proximate cause, and the plaintiff may recover full compensation from either person, or both.

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